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THE DOCTRINE OF NATURAL RIGHTS AND 
THE EVERLASTING MAN 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A 
N the preceding lecture I sought to make us all aware of I the impasse to  which we men have been brought in the 
modern world-of an inner contradiction and confusion 
which has found an outer and visible form in the world 
crisis through which we are passing. T h e  practical confu- 
sion and paradox is, however, as I tried to  point out, but 
an outer and visible sign of an inner and spiritual disgrace 
-of a degradation of men’s ideals of knowledge and reason 
which I described as the degradation of scientific dogma. 
Science, it scarcely requires a philosopher to point out, 
is central in modern life-central not only with regard to  
what we do, but also with regard to  what we think. Wi th  
what we think, moreover, about the world of things and the 
world of men. W e  have a dangerous instrument in our 
hands-a two-edged sword with which man may hew his 
way through things to  God, but also one with which he may 
rend his own manhood, perhaps beyond recovery. 
In the present lecture I invite your attention to  the con- 
sideration of a second dogma of the nineteenth century- 
that  of the absolute value of man and the doctrine of natu- 
ral and inalienable rights in which it found expression. This 
is the democratic dogma par excellence, that  which under- 
lies what we like to  call our entire democratic way of life. 
I t  implies faith in the rational nature of man and in his ra- 
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tional origin and destiny. This is the central faith of what 
men have called the old liberalism, the liberalism of Lincoln 
and of Woodrow Wilson. 
A t  the beginning of the preceding lecture I gave a defini- 
tion of the philosopher which should, I hoped, afford the 
keynote to  the entire discussion. I should like to  begin this 
lecture with another definition which will serve to show the 
relation of the philosopher to human life and culture. “Cul- 
ture,” said Emerson, “is the measure of things taken for 
granted.’’ It is the philosopher who constantly points out 
anew the things that must be taken fo r  granted i f  culture is 
to  be and to survive. T h e  same idea has been expressed by 
the German poet, Ot to  Erich Hartleben: 
Es bleibt der Philosoph von W e r t  fur  alle Zeiten 
E r  findet stets auf’s Neu die Selbstverstandlichkeiten. 
I t  is the Selbstverstundlichkeiten-the things that must for- 
ever be taken for granted-which it is the business of the 
philosopher constantly to  rediscover and to  conserve. I t  
has been truly said that great literature is the orchestration 
of platitudes. I shall not claim for this lecture a place in 
great literature, but I shall nevertheless proceed to  the 
orchestration of a few platitudes. 
11. NIETZSCHE AND T H E  GENEALOGY OF MORALS 
A 
In  the latter part  of the nineteenth century there appeared 
two books by that outstanding figure, Friedrich Nietzsche, 
which, when the story of our present epoch is written, will 
be found to  epitomize the chief tendencies which I described 
in the preceding lecture. They bore the titles, Beyond Good 
and Evi2 and T h e  Genealogy of Morals. Both are closely 
related but it is with the latter that we are here chiefly con- 
cerned. 
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In  this really great book we are told that we must change 
all our moral conceptions-there must be a complete trans- 
valuation of all our values. Hither to  we have taken them 
for  granted-as the measure of culture. In  Nietzsche’s own 
words-of the Preface--(‘we have never seriously consid- 
ered the value of our values themselves.” This  is the ques- 
tion of our century, as he views it, and it is the question set 
us by Darwinian evolution and its view of man. On this 
view he holds all our inherited moral and political values 
are  false. 
Nietzsche, it is important to  realize, starts with the pri- 
macy of science in the modern world, and with the view of 
nature and of man which he thinks is made necessary by 
science. H e  accepts the view of man which follows from 
Darwinian naturalism and seeks to  place both morals and 
politics on a scientific or naturalistic basis. The  human Val- 
ues which we have taken for  granted-the distinctions be- 
tween good and evil inherited from another philosophy of 
man-cannot be grafted upon modern evolutionary natu- 
ralism. W e  must get beyond the distinctions of good and 
evil, as they have been handed down to us by the Greek and 
Christian civilizations, and work out ideas of good and bad 
which are deducible from the biological conception of man. 
“All the sciences,” we are told, “have now to  pave the way 
for  the future task of the philosopher; this task being un- 
derstood to mean that he must solve the problem of value; 
that  he has to  fix the hierarchy of values.” Nietzsche be- 
lieved, moreover, that ,  as he said in Thus  Spake  Zaratlizis- 
tra, God is dead, and with Hi s  death went all the ideals of 
rights and justice which are bound up with belief in Him. 
T h e  theological and philosophical structure with which our 
values are bound up is gone and with that structure go the 
values also. 
I shall never forget the long night in which, as a student 
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in Germany, I first read through the Genealogy of Morals. 
I t  was, I think, the greatest single spiritual adventure of my 
life. In the grey light of the morning I found myself sur- 
veying the wreckage of my beliefs in a curious mood, one in 
which a profound sense of loss was not unmixed with a 
sense of profound exhilaration-of a great task to  be under- 
taken. Enough that I knew from that moment that not only 
was the problem of values my problem, but also that it was 
destined to  be the key problem of the epoch in which I was 
to  live. M y  anticipations were not wrong. T h e  reconstruc- 
tion of our values which followed upon Nietzsche’s chal- 
lenge was not only my problem but that of a large part  of 
recent philosophy. 
I should like to tell the story of the long fight within phi- 
losophy itself which this issue so vividly set by Nietzsche 
precipitated-the struggle to solve the problem of value and 
to  fix the hierarchy of values. I t  is the story of a new field 
in modern philosophy called Axiology. It has been a great 
fight and I rejoice to  have had a part  in  it. Step by step the 
merely subjectivistic and biological theory of values-of 
which Nietzsche was but the extreme protagonist-is being 
met and, as I believe, a t  all important points, being over- 
come. T h e  Ninth International Congress of Philosophy, 
held in Paris in 1937, devoted an entire section to  this prob- 
lem, which shows how fundamental it is in modern philoso- 
phy. Of the fifty o r  more papers devoted to the subject, the 
overwhelming majority represented the standpoint of objec- 
tive and absolute values. 
This is, however, not the immediate subject of this pres- 
ent lecture although the democratic dogma of natural rights 
is closely connected with it. Nietzsche was one of the most 
virulent of all antagonists of this doctrine because, as he 
clearly saw, it presupposes the doctrine of objective and ab- 
solute values. T h e  relations of these two conceptions will 
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appear as we proceed. Le t  us proceed with the special sub- 
ject of this lecture. 
111. THE DOCTRINE OF NATURAL RIGHTS AND THE 
DEGRADATION O F  DEMOCRATIC DOGMA 
A 
I t  is often supposed that the dogma of the rights of man 
is a modern creation-the product of the enlightenment of 
the eighteenth century and of the optimism of the nine- 
teenth. Quite the opposite is the truth. I t  had its origin in 
Greek and Christian theology and philosophy, more specifi- 
cally in the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. I t  was born 
out of the belief in reason and rationality which also gave 
rise to  the scientific dogma of which we have spoken. T h e  
same forces which gave rise to  the degradation of the one 
led also to  the degradation of the other. 
But let us first state this democratic dogma in the famil- 
iar modern form. “We hold it to be self-evident that all 
men are created free and equal and endowed by their Crea- 
to r  with certain inalienable rights.” So the bill of rights in 
the Constitution of the United States; or, as expressed in 
the Virginia Bill of Rights, “All men are by nature equally 
free and independent and have certain inherent rights of 
which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot 
by any compact deprive or divest their posterity, namely, 
the enjoyment of life and liberty and the means of acquiring 
and possessing property and pursuing and obtaining happi- 
ness and safety.” 
H o w  could such a doctrine be grafted upon the evolu- 
tionary naturalism of the nineteenth century? In  the nature 
of the case, it  could not, and it is to  Nietzsche’s eternal 
credit that he saw that it could not be done. H e  saw clearly, 
and repeated it constantly, that it is only upon the basis of 
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the Christian view of man that the doctrine has any signifi- 
cance whatsoever. And yet many, with a lack of logic no- 
torious among us Anglo-Saxons, tried to  hold fast to this 
dogma and a t  the same time to maintain a view of man 
which was in complete contradiction. Gradually this contra- 
diction made itself more and more felt, until the doctrine of 
natural rights was largely abandoned and for it was substi- 
tuted a purely relative and operational conception of rights 
and justice. I think it is of the utmost importance that we 
should realize just what has happened to  this democratic 
dogma in the last decades, that we should fully understand 
where we now stand. 
This process of degradation has been both practical and 
theoretical. In courts of law, principles have been insidiously 
sacrificed to  utility and power. T h e  demands of an ex- 
panding scientific and industrial civilization led to  a con- 
stant violation by capital of these sacred rights-a violation 
which was offset by a corresponding will to power on the 
part  of labor, which, just as callously, ignored these princi- 
ples. I t  is not to  be wondered at ,  therefore, that theoreti- 
cally also-in our universities and law schools-there has 
been a continuous destructive criticism of this dogma-until 
it has finally resulted in an almost complete abandonment of 
this historic foundation of modern law, and in a resort to  a 
theory of force which differs only in expression from that of 
Nietzsche and his followers. 
Even our Supreme Court has not been exempt from its 
influence. In  an article in the Harvard Law Review, Chief 
Justice Holmes spoke in this spirit of the right to life. H e  
tells us that there is no pre-existing right to life. I t  is just 
an arbitrary fact that people wish to  live. I t  simply means 
that i f  you take a life you will have to  suffer the conse- 
quences. H e  even goes on to  suggest the situations in which 
sacrifice of life to  property is justifiable. I have no desire to  
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enter into a dispute with such an authority as Justice Holmes 
but merely to  point out what seems to  me to  be the logic 
of his position. If it is justifiable, as he maintains, to sacri- 
fice a human life for the sake of a valuable ship’s cargo, 
surely it is d: fort iori  justifiable to  sacrifice lives en masse 
for the ends of the State which certainly infinitely transcend 
the value of any ship’s cargo. If there are no absolute values 
underlying law, which he, as an instrumentalist, denies, 
surely there are no limits, except in individual feeling, to  
which this purely pragmatic view of law may not lead. Both 
Marxian and National Socialism have, as we shall see, 
drawn the inevitable consequences. 
Indeed I recall a distinguished professor in one of our 
most important law schools who was willing to  go to  the 
limit in this matter. H e  once remarked in the presence of 
myself and a well-known English theologian, partly no doubt 
to  get a rise out of two old-fashioned moralists, that he saw 
no valid reason why he should not go  out on the street and 
kill a man if he so desired, if he was willing to take the con- 
sequences. T h e  theologian did not bite. He simply took his 
pipe out of his mouth and quietly remarked, “I am glad I 
met you in our host’s drawing room and not on a dark 
street.” 
Do I embarrass you by this plain speaking? Well, I think 
we ought to  be embarrassed by the situation in which mod- 
ern law and politics finds itself. This rake’s progress of 
modern law is precisely the degradation of democratic 
dogma of which Henry  Adams speaks. I think we should 
be aware of this degradation. I think we should also under- 
stand how closely it is connected with the degradation of 
scientific dogma described in the preceding lecture. This  
democratic dogma rests upon a philosophy of nature and of 
man which, it is thought, modern science has made impos- 
sible. T o  this aspect of the problem we must now turn. 
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B 
Modern science, we are constantly told, has forever ex- 
ploded this doctrine of natural rights. Biology and psychol- 
ogy show us that there are no inborn or innate ideas of any 
kind, still less of the nature of rights. History shows us 
that the idea of pre-existing rights is pure myth. There are 
no pre-existing rights physically existing in the individual 
prior to  his entrance into society. T h e  idea that these rights 
inhere in man in any physical sense-in the sense, namely, 
that the qualities yellow, malleability, specific gravity may 
be said to  inhere in the substance gold-is manifestly absurd, 
and belongs to an antiquated science and philosophy. 
Now this is doubtless in part  true, but, so fa r  as I know, 
the view criticized has never been held by any enlightened 
exponent of the doctrine, least of all by the great Christian 
philosopher, St. Thomas Aquinas, who formulated the doc- 
trine. Such conceptions belong to the wholly modern mate- 
rialistic view of nature which none of the classical thinkers 
ever entertained. I t  is part  of the naturalistic fallacy of 
which we spoke in the preceding lecture. When these great 
thinkers spoke of man having by nature these rights, when 
they spoke of them as inhering in man and inalienable from 
his very nature as man, they meant something wholly dif- 
ferent. They had reference to  the ideal essence of man, not 
his physical body. T h e  nature they spoke of was not physi- 
cal nature but spiritual nature. In this sense the doctrine of 
natural rights, as also the phrase, “have by nature,” is not 
only intelligible but represents a fundamental truth. Man’s 
moral end is as much a part  of his nature, as man, as are his 
instincts, and the claims or rights deducible from this rational 
and moral end are as much a part  of his nature as are his 
biological instincts and tendencies. These rights are inalien- 
able. Man  cannot be deprived of them without making him 
less than man. 
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From all this one thing becomes, I think, crystal clear. 
You cannot have the Darwinian conception of man and of 
his nature and a t  the same time retain the democratic dogma 
of natural rights. Here  also you cannot have your cake and 
eat it too. This Nietzsche saw clearly and the various forms 
of totalitarianism have simply put his teachings into prac- 
tice. But the muddle-headed philosophers of democracy 
have not seen this so clearly-to their eternal confusion. It 
is equally clear, I think, that when our fathers said all men 
have by nature certain inherent and inalienable rights-of 
life, liberty, yes, even of property-they had a conception 
of man wholly different from that of modern naturalism and 
materialism. By “nature” they understood a world of rea- 
son created by the Divine Reason which is called God, not 
the nature of mere force and unreason which science, falsely 
so-called, seems to  disclose. In the cosmos there is natural 
law, but there is also moral and spiritual law. In this “na- 
ture” there are, indeed, facts and causes, but there are also 
ends and values. Even the simplest element in nature par- 
takes of the eternal values of the true, the good, and the 
beautiful. W e  can get values out of nature only if  they are 
there from the beginning. W e  can speak of natural rights 
only i f  nature itself is the expression of reason and spirit. 
This is the conception of nature and of natural rights 
embodied in Pope Leo XIII’s encyclical on labor, which has 
become, so to  speak, the basis of action for a large par t  of 
the Christian world on all social and political questions. I t  
is interesting to  recall here my own experience with this fa- 
mous document. Fo r  a number of years I used it in connec- 
tion with courses in Ethics and Social Philosophy, as in fact 
an illustration o r  formulation of an outmoded conception. 
A t  first it appeared to  me, as to  most of my students, ex- 
tremely nai‘ve and traditional. Gradually, as I reread it and 
taught it, it  came to take on a quite different appearance. 
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It  seems to  me now to  be the one adequate expression of 
the entire philosophy upon which our modern democratic 
dogma rests. Gradually I became aware that the instinct of 
the Church has been essentially sound in this matter. So- 
cialism, both communistic and nationalistic, and Christian- 
ity are essentially incompatible. They  start from opposite 
premises and, when thought out, come to  opposite conclu- 
sions. 
IV. MODERN SOCIALISM AND “BOURGEOIS MORALITY” 
A 
T h e  degradation of democratic dogma which I have pic- 
tured in the preceding sections consists, then, in attempting 
to  detach our democratic values from the philosophical 
structure with which they are bound up and to  graft  them 
upon a wholly biological and naturalistic conception of man. 
Is it not inevitable that they should have undergone the 
degradation which I have pictured? 
This process of degradation has been immensely has- 
tened, however, by anti-democratic theories of man both of 
which have been derived from the application of the no- 
tions of physical and biological science to man. I mean com- 
munism and national socialism, which, although differing in 
details, nevertheless have the same philosophical basis. I t  
is immaterial that the one is based upon a materialistic phi- 
losophy of history, the other on a biological materialism of 
Blut zind Bodelz; both are equally inimical to  a transcen- 
dental view of man and to  any doctrine of inherent right. 
I t  is rarely realized how, despite their apparent enmity, 
these two ideologies are in principle so completely one, and 
how they are both derivable from the same fundamental 
premises. Both start from scientific naturalism as their pri- 
mary premise ; both apply this scientific naturalism to  man, 
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reducing man to  a mere par t  of nature. Both inevitably, and 
of necessity, specifically disavow all couceptions of natural 
rights and intrinsic justice ; both make rights and justice 
instrumental to  the existence and survival of the State. 
Finally, both rest upon the denial of the dogma of reason 
in the cosmos and explicitly affirm the scientific irrationalism 
of which I spoke in the preceding lecture. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that ,  in so fa r  as funda- 
mental moral issues a re  concerned, both are  one. Both not 
only challenge Christianity and its distinctive moral values, 
but both abandon equally the democratic dogmas bound up 
with these values. Having abandoned the principle of rea- 
son in human life, which is the essence of the Greco-Chris- 
tian tradition, both find their ultimate sanction, as well as 
their ultimate reality, in force-in the will to  power which 
threatens to  become the fundamental belief of the modern 
world. Force, not reason, is the ultimate in society because 
for  both philosophies it is the ultimate constitution of the 
world. 
B 
Long before the modern dictatorships began to  put so- 
cialism into practice, Sorel, the French philosopher, pointed 
out that  socialism is incompatible with what he called “bour- 
geois morality,” and that  its establishment must mean a new 
morality, a morality of the proletariat. Now I think history 
has shown that  this insight is fundamentally sound and that 
any radical reconstruction of the economic order means, in 
the long run, also a radical reconstruction of the moral or- 
der. Radical reconstruction of economic life means radical 
reconstruction of moral and spiritual life also. This  has 
been amply proved by the developments of Russian Com- 
munism and German National Socialism. In  both cases 
there has been a fundamental reconstruction, not only of 
law but of the doctrine of rights underlying the law. 
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In my callow days I used to  think that the radical views 
of the family associated with Marxianism were extraneous 
-that you could have Marxian economics without Marxian 
morals. I now think that this is impossible. I t  is quite clear, 
I think, that it is impossible to  modify the institution of 
private property as radically as socialism proposes without 
an equally radical remodeling of the family and the whole 
of sex morality. And this is, again, impossible without an 
entire re-education of man in the sentiments connected with 
sex and the family-a complete transvaluation of all values 
in this sphere. But, more than this, I think it is impossible 
to do these things-to remodel radically our institutions of 
family and property without remodeling-and as I think 
destroying-all our ideas of rights and justice. 
T h e  Soviet play Red Rust, produced by the Theater Guild 
in New York, illustrates my point precisely. One of the com- 
munist girls, “married,” in the communist sense, to a com- 
munist leader, cannot rid herself of the old bourgeois ideal 
of constancy and is, therefore, sad over the brutal infideli- 
ties and cynicism of her partner. T o  which one of her more 
enlightened and hardened sisters replies, “Why should they 
be faithful? W e  are merely female animals.” And indeed 
it is hard to  find any reason why they should-on these pre- 
mises. But there is much more to  it than this. T h e  com- 
munists in the play speak quite frankly of the whole struc- 
ture of morality, including the notions of rights and justice 
themselves, as essentially bourgeois virtue, which must dis- 
appear in a communist society. Rights and justice have no 
meaning except as instruments in the service of the will to 
power and survival of the State. 
Let us not be deceived by the confusion of tongues about 
us. An objective analysis of the ideologies of both our allies 
and our enemies implies neither depreciation of the one nor 
sympathy with the other. No economic system or political 
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ideology is the whole of life. There  are impulses and pow- 
ers in human nature, thank God, over and above all systems. 
In the last analysis these impulses and powers reside in all 
men and women, to  whom the Creator has given a common 
humanity. T h e  defense of their soil by the Russians is mag- 
nificent, and, like you, I have followed it with growing ad- 
miration of the possibilities of my fellow men. But this does 
not blind me for a moment to  the principles which underlie 
Russian communism, nor to the practical consequences of 
those principles which we all know. I t  is possible that, as 
Maurice Hindus would have us believe, the experiences 
through which the Russian people are going is bringing a 
change in their ideology and a greater emphasis on the value 
of the individual. I t  may be, but we are here talking about 
what we know to  be the present ideology of the system. 
Let us not, I repeat, be deceived by the confusion of 
tongues about us. I t  seems beyond doubt that we have for 
some time been in a revolutionary period of human history. 
W h a t  the outcome will be depends a t  least in part  upon the 
dominant assumptions about man and his destiny which 
emerge o r  survive. 
Our  present order has been ruled by the democratic 
dogma of inalienable human rights and by the conviction 
that men are subject to  a universal moral law to  which gov- 
ernments must submit and against which unjust governments 
cannot stand. T h e  totalitarian revolutions in Russia and 
Germany explicitly reject this dogma. They  hold that there 
is no moral law superior to the customs of the people and 
the decrees of government. 
Many of you will doubtless say that it is precisely this 
dogma for which we are now fighting-that is why this is 
an ideological war. But how many in the democratic coun- 
tries as well share this naturalistic conviction regarding man 
and his destiny? I t  is surely time to ask whether we can 
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any longer afford to leave the issue obscure. I t  does not 
matter very much-in the long run-whether we quite 
frankly deny this democratic dogma of inalienable rights 
and the whole conception of absolute values that  underlies 
it, o r  whether we subtly undermine it by the doctrine of rela- 
tivism and naturalism which I have described. Personally I 
prefer frankness and even cynicism, for then we know where 
we really stand. 
As a youth I was taught a hard lesson which I have never 
forgotten. I happened to  speak of Gladstone in the pres- 
ence of a typical fine old straightforward English conserva- 
tive, as “the grand old man.” With a snort he replied, 
“grand old humbug.” I have never forgotten that it is pos- 
sible that  liberals may be humbugs. But just as  because pa- 
triotism is the last refuge of scoundrels it does not follow 
that most patriots are not decent God-fearing men, so be- 
cause liberalism is the favorite refuge of humbugs it does 
not follow that most liberals are not forthright and sincere. 
I spoke earlier of a justice of the Supreme Court who de- 
nied all such basal values. I t  is only fair that I should also 
speak of one who asserts them. Justice Cardozo has pointed 
out the dependence of legal concepts on ethics, showing that 
“legal concepts when divorced from ethics, tend to  become 
tyrants and fruitful parents of injustice.” But he goes fur- 
ther than this. H e  points out that, when conflicts in the law 
appear, the resolution of these conflicts always indicates that 
a certain scale of values is presupposed and certain principles 
of precedence acknowledged : a scale, moreover, which how- 
ever it may be strained and pressed out of shape in the strug- 
gle for  existence and power, always tends to reassert itself. 
Fo r  this order or  scale is in the very nature of things. 
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V. BOURGEOIS OR CHRISTIAN MORALITY AND THE 
EVERLASTING MAN 
A 
I t  seems reasonably clear from the foregoing where the 
deepest issues of modern life lie. There  are indeed funda- 
mental economic issues, and with these are bound up other 
problems of the most fundamental kind, both practical and 
philosophical. It is impossible to  change our economic and 
political structures without affecting the moral values which 
they presuppose. But the issue is deeper than this, namely, 
whether the degradation of democratic dogma, and all tha t  
it involves, does not mean ultimately the derationalizing 
and dehumanizing of man. 
But it may be asked why not destroy these values: why 
should the loss of the democratic dogma mean necessarily 
degradation? W h y  not destroy bourgeois morality and sub- 
stitute what Sore1 calls proletarian morality, or Nietzsche 
the morality of the higher man? W h y  not abandon the no- 
tion of universal rights and justice and substitute racial con- 
ceptions of justice? Man’s moral codes and values have 
changed in the past. W h y  not a complete change in the 
future ? 
Well, I may be dreadfully wrong, but I do  not believe 
that there is any such thing as proletarian morality; any 
such thing as racial morality o r  any “new morality” of any 
kind. There  is only human morality and, as a philosopher 
who has given a great deal of thought to this question, I be- 
lieve that human morality expresses the laws of nature and 
of God. 
Leon Trotsky wrote a book making fun of proletarian a r t  
and the ridiculous and artificial attempt to  create it. “There 
is,” he said, “no such thing as proletarian art-only human 
art.” I think he is right and that the same holds for moral- 
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ity. W h a t  a materialistic philosophy of history calls bour- 
geois morality-simply the reflection of economic forms of 
life-is really merely human morality. W h a t  a wholly bio- 
logical and naturalistic theory of man speaks of as a moral- 
ity of sympathy and weakness is simple human morality. In  
any case it is with this simple human morality that democ- 
racy, rightly understood, stands or falls. I t  is built upon the 
doctrine of the Everlasting M a n ,  who abides in essence un- 
changed through all historical changes. This is the essence 
of democratic dogma. 
Here ,  then, we come to the crux of the matter. W e  speak 
of the democratic way of life. But there is no way of life 
which does not presuppose some ideology and embody some 
fundamental dogma. T h e  basis of all democratic dogma is 
the doctrine of the Everlasting Man. This doctrine cannot 
be abandoned without stultification of the inmost essence of 
democracy. And let us not, in our overweening conceit, 
thank God that we are not as other men. F o r  it is precisely 
the point of this entire lecture that we ourselves, in our own 
way, have had  our part  in this universal degradation of dem- 
ocratic dogma. 
VI. DEMOCRATIC DOGMA AND T H E  PHILOSOPHY O F  NATURE 
AND O F  M A N  
A 
I hope we are beginning to  see where all this is inevitably 
leading us. T h e  democratic dogma for which men think 
they are fighting-although they, alas, often deceive them- 
selves-is bound up with certain views of nature and of man. 
T h e  idea of man-the Everlasting Man-has been built up 
through the long years of our Western Christian culture and 
cannot be divorced from it. This idea of man is again 
bound up with certain ideas of nature-of the world in 
which man lives, of the cosmos of which he is a 
Doctrine of Natural Rights 111 
these things which God has joined together no man can put 
asunder. T o  try to  graf t  our Christian ideals and morals 
on the conception of man which follows from evolutionary 
naturalism is as absurd as it is impossible. 
Thomas Mann has said-truly I believe-that “Christian- 
ity and the Greek tradition are and will remain the two main 
pillars of occidental culture. Each pillar supports the other, 
so that no people could abandon or  deny either without shut- 
ting itself off from the moral and spiritual culture of the 
European peoples.” T h e  specific meaning which he gives to 
this statement in the present social and political crisis of 
Europe is obvious. But it has much deeper significance and 
implications. T h e  abandonment of the principles he speaks 
of is not confined to  the particular peoples he has in mind, 
but is, in one form or another, a characteristic tendency of 
our entire modern culture, and present in different forms and 
degrees in all peoples, including our own. I t  is a universal 
phenomenon. More  than this, the moral and spiritual con- 
tinuity of which he speaks is not a matter of feeling or senti- 
ment wholly, but of fundamental religious and metaphysical 
beliefs. 
There  can be no question that there has been a widespread 
abandonment of these pillars in the name of modern science. 
If i t  were proper I could name many leaders of so-called 
liberal thought in England and America who have not only 
themselves abandoned them, but have spent their lives in 
blasting a t  their foundations. I shall confine myself, how- 
ever, to  a description of the modern situation as seen by one 
of the most charming and persuasive of modern writers, the 
well-known biologist, Julian Huxley. H e  asks the question, 
Nli2l Science Des t roy  ReZigion? and he answers it in this 
fashion. Yes it will destroy the ideology with which our 
human values are bound up, but the values themselves re- 
main. 
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Gone, clean gone,” we are told, “is the supposedly neces- 
sary rational basis for the whole magnificent scheme of 
thought which has dominated the world for  over a thousand 
years,” that scheme of thought of which we have found 
Thomas Ahfarm writing. Science, we are told, has demol- 
ished that structure with which our values, our democratic 
dogmas of rights and justice, have been bound up. But these 
realities, or values by which the construction had  life-they 
are found to  persist. 
“The values are there,” we are told. “Even the complete 
mechanist cannot escape them . . . he must acknowledge 
that the ecstasy of beauty, the overpowering awe tha t  some- 
times seizes upon reflection and the rapture of love are facts 
that  have the utmost value for men.” T h e  values are there. 
“ W e  find, moreover, that  some values are higher than 0th- 
ers-there is a scale of values. Some are ends in themselves 
and some only means to  ends, and the higher among them, 
by universal consent, are the values of truth, beauty, love 
and goodness.” 
Thus, he concludes, “science, in taking stock of the world 
is brought up against the existence of values and must ac- 
knowledge them. T h e  search for truth for its own sake, 
irrespective of apparent value; the realization of the exist- 
ence of value as apparent fact;  and then the adjustment of 
mental knowledge and of the control born of knowledge, to  
the value-charged scheme of human thought-that is the 
new humanism.” Yes, that is the new humanism with which 
so much of modern scientific thought presents us. But I 
think it is an amiable illusion which the terrible realities of 
the last decades have torn to  shreds. With Thomas Mann, 
I believe that these values cannot be detached from the theo- 
logical and philosophical structure with which they have 
been bound up and continue to  live. 
One cannot but smile a t  some of the things that are going 
L L  
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on about us. One can scarcely believe his ears when one 
hears men who for decades have sought persistently to  di- 
vorce our Western civilization and culture from its Chris- 
tian basis calling again on the Christian values; when one 
hears men whose teaching has been pure naturalism now ap- 
pealing to  beliefs the very essence of which is the very op- 
posite of naturalism. One may smile, but it is a wry smile. I 
cannot help feeling that in all honesty they should admit 
their mistakes. If in fair weather they wrote “Prefaces to  
hlorals” which consisted in the abandonment of the basis 
of morals, it is only fair that  when, in foul weather, they 
fall back upon the eternal values, they should a t  least recog- 
nize what it is that alone makes them eternal. 
B 
Many of you have doubtless found this lecture a series of 
platitudes. If so, I have no  apology to  make. T h e  truths 
men live by are always platitudinous and the philosopher 
can be well content if  he can but orchestrate them nobly. 
They  are like the humble folk songs which become the mo- 
tifs of the great symphonies and which, precisely because 
they have their roots deep in the rich soil of the common 
life, can lift their heads to  the heavens of absolute music. 
Culture is indeed the measure of things taken for granted 
and it is with these things that must be taken fo r  granted 
that the philosopher must be primarily concerned. When, 
however, within a given culture things are no longer thus 
taken for granted, a crisis in that culture inevitably ensues. 
W e  are now witnessing a culture fighting for its life. Wi th  
this statement most of you would agree but I must warn 
you that I do not mean quite what you mean. I will not 
deny that when a culture has its back to  the wall it  may fight 
for its life with guns and planes, but I am sure that it will 
never save its life in this way. T h a t  is a short cut which, as 
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I think, history has shown is always a movement in a circle. 
I t  simply reinstates in another form the very tyrannies it 
would destroy. Ideas can be fought only by ideas. 
W h a t  then of the fortunes of this fight? Who shall say? 
I t  is possible of course that i t  is a losing fight-that the 
degradation of democratic dogma represents a permanent 
trend in history. I t  is possible that the logical foundations 
of this dogma are indeed gone, that Nietzsche is right and 
men will abandon it for  other ends and values. I t  is possi- 
ble that, as some philosophies of history are telling us, the 
dogma of progress in which our democratic culture has so 
firmly believed must also be abandoned. However this may 
be, these questions bring us to the topic of the third and 
last lecture, “Progress or Regress: T h e  Philosophy of His- 
tory.” 
